Marriage and the State
By Kevin Andrews - Australian Polity - Volume 2 (Number 2)
In 2004, the Australian Parliament codified the millennia long understanding of marriage that had been reflected in the Common Law, namely “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.”
Although the codified definition was and is the policy of the Federal Coalition parties, it attracted widespread Parliamentary support. The reason was clear: it reflected the reality of marriage.
Of all the institutions of human society, marriage is ubiquitous. Across civilisations, cultures and historical eras, the pair bond of a man and a woman has been the primary unit of society. As David Blankenhorn observes: “In all or nearly all human societies, marriage is socially approved sexual intercourse between a woman and a man, conceived both as a personal relationship and as an institution, primarily such that any children resulting from the union are — and are understood by society to be — emotionally, morally, practically and legally affiliated with both of the parents.”
This is the core of marriage.
This conjugal society existed before political institutions and apart from them. The foundation of this society lies in the natural love and obligations of husbands and wives for their biological children. As a pre-political institution, marriage occupies a discreet sphere of human activity.
While many, including Christians, view marriage in theological terms, this understanding of the purpose of marriage is a much older. It was Aristotle who rejected the Socratic idea of a breeding elite in which neither parents nor children knew their biological ties. “Whereas in a state having women and children in common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say ‘my son,’ or the son ‘my father.’ . . . Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection — that a thing is your own and that is your only one — neither can exist in such a state as this.”
Christian views about marriage were a fusion of this earlier philosophy and theological perspectives. This is why attempts to label marriage as simply a religious issue are misplaced.
As John Locke noted, the relationship between husband and wife is ancillary to the relationship between parent and child. The genius of marriage, across cultures and civilisations, has been its ability to tie the male into the mother-child bond.
This obligation is not created by the state. Nor can the state remove it. As Aristotle observed: “Man is by nature more inclined to live as a couple than to associate politically, since the family is something that precedes and is more necessary than the state.”
Today there is another, competing view of marriage. Instead of a pro-child, social institution, as it has been regarded historically, some propose that marriage be based on the gratification of (two) consenting adults. In other words, the self-fulfilment of adults is to replace the social institution centred on the wellbeing of children. This view has a number of profound consequences.
First, it overturns the understanding that marriage protects vulnerable children by placing on their biological parents the responsibilities for their moral and practical education and upbringing. It also ignores the overwhelming social science evidence that such an arrangement is optimal for the wellbeing of children and the welfare of society.
Secondly, it politicises the institution of marriage in a novel and dangerous manner, and extends the role of the state beyond its rightful place. Marriage exists independent of state power. It does not require the state to do anything. However, a redefinition of marriage can only occur by state decree. Marriage is no longer a fundamental institution of civil society, but a right, granted by the state.
Instead of recognising and supporting the reality that a particular man and woman are parents of a particular child, the state usurps it. This is a destruction of marriage, not simply a redefinition. It indulges a dangerous totalitarian impulse, or as Tocqueville put it, a “soft despotism” that undermines liberty and freedom.
Once marriage becomes a creature of the state, the state will be called upon to create the social conditions to protect such unions. If the state can define marriage as something new and novel, it can define other arrangements. It can “educate” people to accept this new arrangement. If this is doubted, then examine what has happened in parts of Canada. Or read the editorial in the New York Times in which exemptions for religious bodies were decried after that state’s legislature voted in favour of ‘same-sex’ marriage.
For years, it was argued that people in same-sex relationships were discriminated against, particularly their superannuation arrangements. But all such discrimination has been removed. This was right to do, as superannuation is a new form of property which people should be able to dispose of according to their individual choice. Continuing claims of discrimination are spurious, as are attempts to appropriate civil rights language to the cause of ‘same-sex’ marriage.
Coalition policy supports the current definition. This policy is built on sound historical and practical foundations. To date has been supported by the Labor Party. Ms Gillard says she supports it. It will be interesting to see whether her support is matched by the advocacy of her position amongst the Labor factions.
There is no widespread agitation for changing the definition, only a small vocal minority who wish to re-order society in their own vision. Such a proposal runs counter to reality; it extends the reach of the state beyond its rightful sphere; and it endangers the welfare and wellbeing of children which marriage primarily protects. Such proposals should continue to be rejected.
